Introduction and background
Viet Nam's economic achievements since the start of đổi mới in 1986 are remarkable. Real income per capita (purchasing power parity basis) in 1990 was only 5.2 per cent of the income levels of high-income countries. By 2016, this reached 13.8 per cent (World Bank, 2017) . More importantly, the percentage of the population living in poverty dropped from 77.1 per cent in 1992 to 12.0 per cent in 2014.
1 Viet Nam's economic achievements are partly due to its export success (WTO, 2013) . However, a majority of the country's exports are from foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) with a 70.7 per cent share of Viet Nam's exports in 2015, and FIEs import more than half of their inputs (Malesky, 2016) . This means that a large part of Viet Nam's exports are predicated on assembly work with minimal local content.
There is recognition on the part of Viet Nam's government that small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) might benefit from internationalization through exposure to increased competition and quality standards, or through learning by doing.
2 Decision No.
SMEs make a joint decision: to export or not, and whether to produce as subcontractor or not. The first is a market entry decision while the second is an operation mode decision. Subcontracting arrangements require an institutional environment where contracts are enforceable. When contract enforcement is weak, enterprises are less likely to enter into subcontracting arrangements due to the additional costs associated with finding alternative buyers if commissioning firms fail to honour contracts. Likewise, subcontracting arrangement exclusivity is dependent on the contract sensitivity of the products involved in the transactions. 8 Exclusive subcontracting offers increase as products are required to conform to commissioning firms' specifications. An enforceable exclusive contract involves higher margins for subcontractors as products tend to be more specialized rather than homogeneous. Empirically, these suggest that subcontracting (compared to competitive spot bidding) is more likely in industries involving products that are more contract-intensive or differentiated. Past studies on foreign market entry mode choice have traditionally looked at firms' choice among exporting, foreign direct investment, and licensing primarily because historically only developed-country firms 'go global'. While there is growing literature on the internationalization strategies of emerging economy firms, the focus is mostly on 'large' firms. Thus, studies focus on greenfield versus acquisition strategies of emerging economy multinationals in developed markets (e.g. see Anderson & Sutherland, 2015; Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012) , or whether investments are made to access advanced technology such as Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's PC business. A related literature is the cross-border merger and acquisition choices of emerging market firms (e.g. see Dailami et al., 2012) . For SMEs from developing countries, a more suitable choice set is whether to enter foreign markets (export directly or indirectly) or not, and whether to produce as subcontractor to commissioning firms or not. 9 Subcontracting arrangements take various forms in developing countries. Most common is subcontracting for foreign-invested enterprises in the garment industry in a number of countries such as Viet Nam and Laos wherein commissioning firms take the dominant role (e.g. Kongmanila & Takahashi, 2009) . SMEs face capital, technology, and market access constraints, thus working as subcontractors or suppliers to large multinational enterprises (MNEs) is one approach to surmounting these constraints. 10 Being part of an international network opens new possibilities and provides opportunities for SMEs to build their capacity and enhance their competitiveness. Melitz's (2003) model with heterogeneous firms and exporting fixed costs is also pertinent to our empirical work. In essence, Melitz's model predicts that the most productive firms service domestic and foreign markets, firms with intermediate productivity levels only service the domestic market, and the least productive firms would exit. Building on Melitz's framework, Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) introduce intermediaries. Intermediaries provide firms an option to export indirectly instead of exporting directly. Ahn et al. (2011: 75) show that 'firms of intermediate levels of productivity use intermediation while the most productive firms directly reach foreign consumers'. Micro-data from various countries confirm the predictions of the models. Among myriad factors found to be important in firms' foreign market entry decisions (to export or not), we focus on firms' access to finance (both formal and informal sources), knowledge of relevant laws, and technical capacity.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between the decision to export and firms' financial position is mixed. Wagner (2014) gives a recent review of this literature. Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2010) find no relationship between firms' exporting propensity and financial position using French firm-level data while Japanese firms' exports are sensitive to the health of their reference banks (Amiti & Weinstein, 2011) . The role of access to credit on the decision to export among firms from developing countries is less understood and is, in fact, more relevant as financial constraints are more binding for these firms (Berman & H ericourt, 2010) . Using data from as many as 5000 firms from nine developing and emerging countries, Berman and H ericourt (2010) find that the probability of exporting increases with the magnitude of firms' internal (cash flow-to-total asset ratio) and external (total debt-to-total asset ratio) funds.
Mixed evidence also characterizes the decision to subcontract and firms' financial position. Kimura (2002) finds no significant relationship between Japanese firms' financial position (proxied by the operating surplus to total sales ratio) and their decision to work as a subcontractor whereas Hayashi (2002) finds that metalworking and machinery firms with no problem accessing finance have higher subcontracting orders relative to total sales ratio in Indonesia. The author concludes that access to finance enables SMEs to fully take advantage of subcontracting opportunities with large-scale enterprises more easily.
It is widely believed that the availability of financing from informal creditors makes financial constraint less of a problem among SMEs, and informal finance might be an important source of operational funds or expansion capital. One reason is because loans from banks can involve lengthy documentation while informal loans require little or no documentation (Khan, 2015) . Another reason for this is that, unlike banks, providers of informal credit are not required to meet capital, reserve, or liquidity requirements and other regulations (Waldron, 1995) . They can also collect information about borrowers at lower costs than banks due to having a prior relationship with borrowers (Lin & Sun, 2006) . Thus, informal lenders have more flexibility in structuring loan terms including the rate of interest, repayment schedule, and collateral requirement (Waldron, 1995) . The evidence on how access to informal finance impacts firms in developing countries is likewise mixed. One strand finds that firm performance (e.g. return on assets and net income reinvestment rate) improves with access to informal finance while bank loans have negligible effects (e.g. Su & Sun, 2011) . A second strand finds that funds from family and friends do not contribute to SME growth, and some forms of informal credit (e.g. borrowing from money lenders) are, in fact, detrimental to firm growth (e.g. Khan, 2015) .
The literature has emphasized the importance of institutional context under which firms operate. For example, at the macro level, countries with better quality institutions do more trade (e.g. M eon & Sekkat, 2008) and attract more foreign direct investment (e.g. Kurul, 2017) . As discussed previously, subcontracting arrangements are more likely when contracts are enforceable, as both parties to the contract receive protection. At the micro level, we argue that while the institutional environment firms operate in is relevant, knowledge of existing laws by owners or managers is equally relevant. As far as we can tell, no one has formally explored the possibility that current knowledge of relevant laws by owners or managers might affect their foreign market entry and mode of operation decisions. When studying SMEs, knowledge of existing laws is crucial. Limited or lack of knowledge of customs procedures or regulations might prevent even the most successful small, domestic market-oriented enterprises from expanding into foreign markets. Limited or lack of knowledge of regulations governing investments hinders enterprises from taking full advantage of preferences available for those operating in support (e.g. subcontractor) of select activities such as garment production. Viet Nam's 2011-15 SME Development Plan recognizes the importance of access to information. It specifically provides for the establishment of an information network where the public can easily access legal documents and portals to disseminate policies and government programmes available to SMEs.
There is some evidence that the propensity to export increases with new product introductions. Bernard and Jensen (2004) find export probability increases by about 3 per cent whenever US plants experience a change in their industry classification (interpreted as new product introductions by the authors) for plants operating from 1984 to 1992. It is important to note that there is a strand of literature studying the interdependence between the decision to export and the decision to innovate. For example, for a panel of German firms, Becker and Egger (2013) find that both product and process innovation increase the likelihood that firms export, and the estimated effect is larger for product innovation. For SMEs from developing countries, the adoption of new processes or technologies (which increase efficiency) or merely coming out with better versions of existing products might be a sufficient threshold to compete internationally. Our paper is closest in sprit to Nguyen at al. (2008) who use the 2005 version of the survey. They find that product innovation, process innovation, and product modification all contribute to the likelihood of exporting, with process innovation having the smallest coefficient estimate in the probit regressions. We build on their work by considering a wider set of issues after Viet Nam's entry to the WTO and after the global financial crisis of 2008.
Data
We use data from the 2011, 2013, and 2015 versions of the 'Survey of Small and Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Viet Nam' made available by the United Nations University World Institute for Development Research (UNU-WIDER). To administer the biennial surveys, UNU-WIDER collaborates with Viet Nam's Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) and the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MoLISA). The surveys were administered in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, Long An, Phu Tho, Quang Nam, Nghe An, Khanh Hoa, and Lam Dong. These cover northern, central, and southern regions of the country. Stratified sampling ensures representation by ownership type across the nine areas. The surveys include non-state locally-owned manufacturing enterprises only.
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The survey asks whether an enterprise exports, and if yes, how. Ideally, we would like to classify enterprises into three mutually exclusive groups: 1) exporting directly only, 2) exporting both directly and indirectly (through trading companies), or 3) exporting indirectly only. But, available data lump 1) and 2) together to define direct exporters. Enterprises in groups 1) and 2) are classified as direct exporters while enterprises that belong in any of the three groups are classified as exporters. Exporter is set equal to 1 if an enterprise exports directly, indirectly, or both, 0 otherwise while direct exporter equals 1 if an enterprise exports directly, or both directly and indirectly, 0 otherwise. Note that direct exporters is a subset of exporters. The use of the stricter definition (direct exporter) tests the notion that barriers to exporting directly are higher than when exporting indirectly.
12 Subcontractor is set equal to 1 if an enterprise produce as subcontractor, 0 otherwise. We classify enterprises according to their actual responses to the survey questions described above. Thus, direct exporters can be subcontractors too. Available data do not provide the breakdown of exports exclusively through subcontracting agreements. Likewise, the breakdown of subcontracting revenue into domestic sales and exports is also not available. These limitations preclude us from studying the decision to engage via direct exports only vis-a-vis foreign subcontracting. In the SME literature, it is common practice to distinguish micro enterprises from SMEs. This is because micro enterprises are primarily household ventures established to make a living, as opposed to SMEs which are mostly established to take advantage of available business opportunities. For this reason, we only include SMEs in our estimation sample below.
13 For reference, summary statistics for the three main variables appear in Table 1 . 14 In the three survey years, 14-17 per cent of the SMEs are exporters, 15 8-11 per cent are direct exporters, and 13-14 per cent are subcontractors. Very few are both exporters and subcontractors (about 3 per cent), and 11 The surveys exclude joint stock companies with state capital and joint ventures with foreign capital 'due to the often unclear nature of government and foreign involvement in such ownership structures.' (UNU-WIDER, various years). 12 Since direct exporters in our data set also export using intermediaries, we are unable to clearly delineate the role of intermediaries in the SMEs' exporting decision.
But, combining the predictions of Melitz's (2003) and Ahn et al.'s (2011) models, we expect the most productive enterprises to export directly (1), or both directly and indirectly (2), and those with lower levels of productivity will only export indirectly (3). 13 In an early version of the paper, micro enterprises are included in the estimations. For the most part, results with or without micro enterprises are qualitatively similar. 14 The entire dataset has 7702 observations with 1721 enterprises surveyed in three years, 757 in two years, and 1025 in one year. The summary statistics in Table 1 exclude SMEs with more than 300 full-time employees, those classified as service providers, and two observations that indicate having state and foreign capital. 15 Nguyen et al. (2008) there is some evidence that the two decisions are inter-related as the Pearson χ 2 statistics lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 per cent level of significance that the decision to export and produce as subcontractor is independent in two years. Thus, our estimation approach below accounts for this possibility.
Empirical methodology
We distinguish four types of enterprises: non-subcontractors who do not export (base or control group), subcontractors who do not export, non-subcontractors who export, and subcontractors who export. The bivariate random effects (panel) probit model is used for two reasons: First, less than 20 per cent (15 per cent) of the sample are exporters (subcontractors) ( Table 2 ). Among exporters, the mean exports to revenue shares are 27 per cent for subcontractors and 29.8 per cent for non-subcontractors. 16 Among subcontractors, the mean subcontracts to revenue shares are 8.6 per cent for exporters and 12.5 per cent for non-exporters. These low rates are indicative of the difficulty of becoming an exporter or subcontractor: SMEs must surpass thresholds (e.g. productivity threshold) before they can export or work as subcontractor. 17 Second, the bivariate random effects (panel) probit model allows for the theoretical possibility that the exporting and subcontracting thresholds are correlated, and thus, the decisions of whether to export or not (y 1 Þ and whether to work as subcontractor or not (y 2 Þ might be correlated. These two decisions (outcomes) are determined by two unobserved latent variables (y * 1 and y * 2 Þ:
(1) where x includes regressors common to both decisions while z 1 and z 2 include regressors relevant to each decision. The u i 's are enterprise-specific (i) errors which are time invariant. Each u j is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 uj , where j ¼ 1, 2. The ε it 's are random errors and ε 1 and ε 2 are jointly normally distributed with means of 0 and variances equal to 1, and a correlation equal to ρ.
18 The two observed outcomes are defined as follows:
Note that y 1 ¼ 0 and y 2 ¼ 0 is the base or control group, and if ρ is equal to zero, the bivariate random effects (panel) probit regression model is equivalent to two separate random effects (panel) probit regression models. With the exception of three factors, the same specification is used for both decision equations as factors that are associated with market entry decisions are more likely also associated with mode of operation choices. That is, there is a productivity threshold that firms must 'jump' or 'surpass' before they can export. One might imagine a comparable threshold for working as a subcontractor. All else equal, commissioning firms might offer subcontracts to the most productive firms, alternatively, only the most productive firms will seek out and 'win' subcontracts from contractors. 18 A non-zero correlation means that unobserved characteristics (such as manager ability) that make enterprises more (less) likely to be exporters overlap with unobserved characteristics that make them more (less) likely to be subcontractors. Ignoring the potential correlation between the error terms of the two decision equations might lead to incorrect inferences. See Greene (2000) for details. We use Plum's (2016) bireprob routine (for Stata) which allows ε 1 and ε 2 to be correlated, and for the random effects error terms (u 1 and u 2 ) to be correlated as well. Berman and H ericourt's (2010) baseline specification in defining matrix x. Matrix x includes period, location, sector, and ownership type qualitative indicators, firm size, productivity, and access to credit. Two period indicators (SY15 and SY13 are set to 1 for 2015 and 2013, respectively, 0 otherwise) control for time-specific shocks that affect all enterprises in the same way. Survey year 2011 is the base period. The location indicators account for city or province-level differences in characteristics or policies towards SMEs while the sector indicators account for sector-level differences in fixed costs that might affect SMEs' exporting and subcontracting decisions. We define three location indicators: Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Hai Phong. These are large metropolitan areas in Viet Nam. All other areas comprise the base location. We hypothesize that enterprises in these three metropolitan areas are more likely to be exporters and independent operators. We also define eight qualitative indicators for the main sector that enterprises operate in with basic and fabricated metal products as the reference sector. Ownership is set equal to 1 for limited liability companies and joint stock companies without state capital; 0 otherwise. Sole proprietorships, partnerships, and collectives/cooperatives form the base category, and this ownership type is expected to have a lower propensity to export or to produce as subcontractors.
Firm size is proxied by total assets and labour productivity is the ratio of value added over the number of full-time workers. We use the natural log of these variables. Size is a cost shifter; larger enterprises may face lower costs, thus are more likely to export (also see Bernard & Jensen, 2004) or to operate as subcontractors. The likelihood of exporting is expected to be positively associated with productivity (Bernard & Jensen, 2004) and so is the likelihood of being a subcontractor. We would ideally prefer to estimate productivity using Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) methodology, but data limitation prevents us from doing so.
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The survey asks whether the enterprise has applied for bank loans or other formal credit or informal credit since the last survey, whether the enterprise encountered problems in getting credit, and whether the enterprise needs more credit. Following Rand (2007) , financially constrained is set equal to 1 if an enterprise has applied for formal credit and indicates 'in need of a loan', regardless of whether it encountered problems in getting credit or not, equal to 0 otherwise. Notice that an enterprise that did not apply for formal credit is considered financially unconstrained using this definition. This creates a self-selection problem in that enterprises expecting not to qualify for formal credit (say from prior experience) will not apply altogether, and will use informal credit channels instead. To account for this, we also set this variable to 1 when an enterprise did not apply for formal credit but did apply for informal credit because it 'couldn't get formal credit'. This partly mitigates the self-selection problem described above, and includes the possibility that firms' inability to access formal credit markets force them to tap informal credit markets.
All else equal, we hypothesize that enterprises with access to external finance are more likely to export and not to produce as subcontractors. Exporting requires large up-front investments, and access to finance provides enterprises with the necessary liquidity or investment capital to enter foreign markets (e.g. Berman & H ericourt, 2010) . Enterprises prefer to earn as much of the producers' surplus as possible. Intuitively, subcontractors earn a smaller portion of the surplus compared to non-subcontractors. One reason for choosing the subcontracting option is limited access to finance to purchase raw material inputs. Commissioning firms might supply the needed inputs in a subcontracting arrangement whereas a loan might be required when the enterprise is not a subcontractor. 20 Thus, financially constrained enterprises are expected to be more likely to produce as subcontractors.
Additional regressors
We expand Berman and H ericourt's (2010) specification. Average monthly wages paid to production workers (wages) is indicative of the quality of an enterprise's production workers (Bernard & Jensen, 2004) , and there is evidence in the literature that the probability of exporting increases with labour quality (e.g. Schank, Schnabel, & Wagner, 2010) . The probability of producing as a subcontractor declines with wages if subcontracting is primarily motivated by labour cost savings. Viet Nam's comparative advantage is in the production of unskilled labour-intensive goods, so we expect the probability of exporting and subcontracting to be positively correlated with the proportion of production workers to total employment (production worker share). We also control for the length of time an SME has been in operation and the manager's or owner's ethnicity. There is some evidence in the literature that younger firms are more likely to become exporters (e.g. Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006) . Thus, we expect the probability of exporting to decline with enterprise age. Managers or owners belonging to the major ethnic group (Kinh) might have wider and stronger business connections or networks, thereby increasing the likelihood of exporting and producing as subcontractor (see e.g. Hayashi, 2002) .
There is reason to believe that knowledge of relevant laws is a crucial determinant of business decisions. This stems from the results of a recent survey that find that very few Vietnamese businesses have taken advantage of the benefits emanating from Viet Nam's existing free trade agreements (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014); either their knowledge of the benefits is minimal or they find the rules too troublesome to learn. The Law on Customs and the Law on Investment are relevant for our purposes. Responses to 'How would you characterize knowledge about the following laws and government regulations' range from 1 (good) to 4 (no knowledge/no interest). The Law on Customs governs exporting and importing activities in Viet Nam, we hypothesize that the likelihood of exporting increases with knowledge of the Law on Customs. The Law on Investments regulates investment activities of domestic and foreign investors in Viet Nam, so we expect knowledge of this particular law to affect subcontracting decisions, but exactly how is ambiguous. While knowledge of the law increases the likelihood of operating independently because the manager or owner is aware of the 'rules of the game', knowledge of the law might also increase the likelihood of producing as a subcontractor because the law covers business cooperation contracts, wherein parties cooperate in production (Article 23 2005 Law on Investment). 21 Bernard and Jensen (2004) find that US plants introducing new products (new product is set equal to 1) have a higher likelihood of exporting. New product introductions expand enterprises' markets via the product space. In the context of developing-country SMEs, their ability to compete internationally might not require new product group introductions; mere adoption of new processes or technologies (new process is set to 1) or coming out with better versions of existing products (product improvement is set to 1) might be sufficient thresholds for exporting.
22 According to Esteve-P erez and Rodríguez (2013: 234) , process innovations 'associated with costsavings and improvements in technical conditions, enhance firm efficiency, which could prompt export market participation.' Product improvements broaden or lengthen enterprises' market reach. We expect these to increase the likelihood of exporting and being independent operators, and prior research (e.g. Nguyen, Pham, Nguyen, & Nguyen, 2008) suggests that the estimated effects on the likelihood to export is larger for new product introductions than for new process adoptions. Lastly, we include one more control in the subcontracting equation. Sharpston (1975) emphasizes that 'subcontracting avoids the problems of marketing: outlets, brand names, publicity, market research, design' (Sharpston, 1975: 118) . Using this logic, a priori, we expect enterprises that advertise (advertise set equal to 1) are less likely to be subcontractors.
Because we are unable to distinguish between exit and exit from the survey, we only use SMEs surveyed in all three years in our panel regressions (434 enterprises, excluding observations with incomplete information).
23 Table 2 contains (overall) summary statistics for our sample by enterprises' exporting and subcontracting status. A larger percentage of the exporters (regardless of subcontracting status) is observed in survey year 2015 and located in Ho Chi Minh City. Non-exporting subcontractors are mostly observed in Hanoi and other areas. Exporter-subcontractors mostly produce textile and apparel while exporter-non-subcontractors mostly produce food, beverages, and tobacco products. A large percentage of the non-exporters (regardless of subcontracting status) are in basic and fabricated metals production.
On average, our sample has VND 9.9-27.4 billion worth of assets, 24-61 full-time employees, each employee generates about VND 57-75.1 million of value added. Exporters have more assets and employees, and are more productive than non-exporters, on average. Among exporters, non-subcontractors have more assets and are more productive. The opposite is true among non-exporters. Data show a higher percentage of exporters are financially constrained. On average, the monthly wage of a production worker is about VND 1.6 million, production workers comprised 65-73 per cent of the workforce, enterprises have been in operation for about 12 years, and less than 5 per cent have ethnic minority managers or owners. Exporters have better knowledge of the Law on Customs and Law on Investment than non-exporters. About 7-12 per cent of the enterprises introduced new products, 12-25 per cent made improvements to existing products, and 8-23 per cent adopted new processes or technologies. Regardless of subcontracting status, a larger percentage of exporters introduced new products or new processes or technologies. About 30-72 per cent of the enterprises advertise with the highest proportion of exporter-subcontractors advertising. The pairwise correlations among all continuous variables appear in Table 3 for reference. They range from À0.28 (total assets and knowledge of customs law) and 0.49 (knowledge of customs and investment laws).
Analysis of results
We estimate equation (1) using three specifications for exporter and direct exporter as regressands. These three specifications differ in the proxy used for technical capacity: introduced new products (specification 1), made product improvements (specification 2), and adopted new processes or technologies (specification 3). Table 4 contains bivariate random effects (panel) probit estimates using the broad exporter definition while Table 5 contains results using direct exporter as regressand. The bivariate random effects (panel) probit estimates show that the correlation between the residuals of the two decision equations range from À0.15 to 0.52, not significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level in all specifications except one (specification (3) in Table 4 ). Since the cross-equation correlations are not significantly different from zero, we can reasonably be confident that estimating the two decision equations separately using the single-equation random effects (panel) probit model would provide similar conclusions. Tables 6 and 7 contain the estimates using exporter and direct exporters as regressands, respectively. 24 For the most part, results using the strict exporter definition are qualitatively similar to those using the broad exporter definition. Patterns described below are based on coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level using both definitions of exporting.
From Tables 6 and 7 , we find evidence that the propensity to export increased in the 2015 survey compared to 2011 survey year, as the coefficient for SY15 is significantly different from zero. Compared to SMEs in less urbanized regions of the country, we consistently find that SMEs in Ho Chi Minh City have higher likelihood of exporting, and there is some evidence that those in Hai Phong have a higher likelihood of producing as subcontractors. Ho Chi Minh City is the commercial capital of Viet Nam and is home to a large percentage of FIEs which export. 25 This means Ho Chi Minh City has the requisite infrastructure and services conducive for exporting benefiting local SMEs as well. Hai Phong is a port city in the north, and data show the city attracts bigger projects than Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. General Statistics Office (2016) data show that accumulated registered capital from foreign direct investment (FDI) in Hai Phong is US$25.8 million per project compared with Hanoi's US$6.5 million and Ho Chi Minh City's US$6.7 million. The rate for the entire country is US$13 million. Because FDI projects in Hai Phong are comparatively large, there are more opportunities for subcontract work in Hai Phong compared to other areas. Compared to those in basic and fabricated metal manufacturing (base industry), SMEs in several industries have a higher propensity to export (using broad exporter definition only). This includes SMEs that produce food, textile and apparel, leather and wood products, rubber and non-metallic products, or furniture (Table 6 ). These are Viet Nam's known comparative advantages. SMEs in food, beverage, or tobacco manufacturing have the lowest probability of producing as subcontractors. Compared with basic and fabricated metal products, a smaller proportion of food products is identified by Rauch (1999) as differentiated, so this result is consistent with our expectations that subcontracting is more likely in industries involving products that are differentiated as these potentially provide higher margins. There is no evidence that exporting and subcontracting decisions are a function of ownership type among locally-owned SMEs.
The propensity to export is positively associated with enterprise size (log of assets) as expected. This is consistent with studies using data from developed countries covering establishments of all sizes (e.g., Bernard & Jensen, 2004) . Viet Nam's current comparative advantage is in labour-intensive products; thus, it is not surprising to find that enterprises with higher production worker shares have higher propensity to export. Among Viet Nam's SMEs, we find no evidence in support of the notion that subcontractors are larger or have higher worker-to-total-employment shares than non-subcontractors. Exporting and subcontracting decisions do not appear to be associated with variations in labour productivity and workforce quality (log of wages), and whether SMEs have access to external funds. 26 A closer look at the data shows that although exporters are more productive, on average, variations in this variable do not systematically explain the likelihood of exporting. This is quite surprising as prior studies consistently find that the likelihood of exporting increase with productivity. One study using Vietnamese data find this relationship (Newman, Rand, Tarp, & Nguyen, 2014) . However, Newman et al. (2014) use data for much larger enterprises (those with at least 30 employees and only a representative sample of smaller enterprises is included) whereas our sample consists of smaller enterprises (30 employees, on average). Difference in size coverage might explain the difference in findings. It is worth noting that unlike subcontractors in developed countries such as Italy (see Razzolini & Vannoni, 2011) , subcontractors (regardless of exporting status) in Viet Nam, on average, are slightly more productive. But again, variations in labour productivity do not systematically explain the probability of working as subcontractors. Perhaps finding that SMEs' access to funds do not correlate well with their foreign market strategies and modes of operation should not be surprising as shortage of capital is not as important a growth constraint as in the past. Shortage of capital was the most important growth constraint for 54 per cent of the survey respondents in 2011 (just after the global financial crisis), but in 2015, only 22 per cent identify shortage of capital as the most important growth constraint. SMEs with Kinh managers or owners have higher a likelihood of exporting directly (Table 7) . This variable is a good proxy for the breadth and depth of one's business connections and networks, and SMEs with managers or owners belonging to the majority ethnic group have wider and deeper business connections and networks.
There is evidence that the probability of exporting increases with a manager's or owner's self-reported knowledge of customs law (recall, low values indicate 'good' knowledge of the law). Creation and expansion of information networks and portals for SME expansion is one of the objectives of the 2011-15 SME Development Plan. To the extent that these informational campaigns have reached the SMEs in our sample, our results suggest that these campaigns have had the intended effects of affecting business decisions. Contrary to expectations, there is some evidence that enterprises that advertise are more likely to work as subcontractors. Sharpston (1975) suggests that enterprises work as subcontractors to avoid marketing problems such as establishing a brand or finding outlets. Our result suggests the opposite, and indicative of the possibility that SMEs with locally-recognized brand names (thus, are advertising) are able to compete more successfully for subcontract work, all else equal. 24 We use Stata's xtprobit routine which unlike Plum (2016) bireprobit provides standard errors clustered at the enterprise level. 25 At the end 2016, data show that 15.4 per cent of accumulated registered capital from foreign direct investment projects are in Ho Chi Minh City (General Statistics Office, 2016) . 26 A specification using internal access to finance (cash flow-to-total assets) provides qualitatively similar results and are available upon request. (2008), we do not consistently find that SMEs that export have better technical capacity. The probability of exporting (broad definition) is only associated with the introduction of new processes or technologies (Table 6 ). This is most likely because compared to the 2005 version of the survey used by Nguyen et al. (2008) 27 Finally, there is some evidence that enterprises that have introduced improvements on existing products (independent of buyer requirements) are more likely to work as subcontractors. These improvements enhance the capabilities of SMEs to compete for subcontract work. It is possible that as enterprises engage in exporting and/or subcontracting, their managers or owners learn relevant laws. We account for this potential endogeneity by using instrumental variable estimation for probit models. 28 An instrument is needed for knowledge of customs and knowledge of investment law. A good instrument must satisfy two properties: it is correlated with the variable it is instrumenting; and, it is uncorrelated with unobserved factors in the export/subcontract decision equations. We use knowledge of tax law as instrument. 29 Intuitively, managers or owners with 'good' knowledge of customs law would also have 'good' knowledge of other laws; and, knowledge of tax law is less likely to be correlated with unobserved factors in the exporting (subcontracting) decision equation than knowledge of customs (investment) law. There is strong evidence that knowledge of tax law is a valid instrument for knowledge of customs and investment laws in all specifications of the model. The first column of Table 8 shows the coefficients for knowledge of tax law from first stage regressions of knowledge of customs or investment law on the instrument and all exogenous variables in the relevant decision equation. 30 For all three specifications (1-3) used, these show that knowledge of tax law is associated with knowledge of both customs and investment law (statistically significant at the 1 per cent level). The coefficient estimates of the relevant law in the decision equations (main equations, second stage regressions) are in the second column of Table 8 . These have the same signs as those in the bivariate (Tables 4 and 5 ) and single-equation (Tables 6 and 7 ) random effects (panel) probit regressions. Information in the third column of Table 8 show low to no correlation between the residuals of the decision (main) equations and the residuals of first stage regressions, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the correlations are equal to zero (p-values for the Wald test of exogeneity are in the last column of Table 8 ). 30 All coefficient estimates are not shown due to space limitation, but available upon request. We also experimented with other potential instruments. We considered the number of times the enterprise was inspected by government officials for policy compliance (e.g. labor law) or technical compliance (e.g. environmental) and provinces' legal regimes (a component of the Provincial Competitiveness Index). SMEs that have experienced more inspections or are located in areas with weak legal regimes have incentives to learn various laws (thus, satisfying the first requirement of a good instrument: it is correlated with the variable it is instrumenting for), and they are not correlated with the unobserved factors in the exporting or subcontracting equations. The number of inspections and legal regimes might affect enterprise performance, but not necessarily their foreign market entry or mode of operations decisions. These alternative instruments did not satisfy the first requirement for a valid instrument. They are not correlated with either knowledge of customs or investments law.
C.Y. Co et al. International Review of Economics and Finance 58 (2018) 449-466
We provide the (average) marginal effects from the single-equation random effects (panel) probit regressions in Table 9 (exporter) and Table 10 (direct exporter) to highlight the economic significance of our findings. First, the likelihood of exporting is about 6 percentage points higher in 2015 compared to 2011, 10 percentage points higher for SMEs located in Ho Chi Minh City, SMEs producing leather or wood products have the highest likelihood of exporting with a marginal effect of 0.21, and SMEs in food or furniture manufacturing have the lowest likelihood of working as subcontractors with marginal effects of about À0.12 (not shown in Tables 9 and  10 ). Second, a one-percentage point increase in the share production workers increase the exporting likelihood by 0.14-0.19 points, and SMEs operated by Kinh managers or owners have a 0.07 higher likelihood of exporting directly. Because the thresholds for exporting directly are higher, SMEs with broader and wider business connections and networks are more likely to 'jump' these thresholds.
Third, exporting decisions are associated with knowledge of customs law. Note that knowledge of customs law for our sample is between 'average' and 'poor' (Table 2) . Tables 9 and 10 show that a one-index point drop in knowledge of customs law (e.g. improvement from 'poor' (index value of 3) to 'average' (index value of 2) increases the exporting likelihood by 0.032-0.037. These marginal effects appear small, but considering that only 18 percent (0.18) of the SMEs in the sample are exporters and only 10 per cent (0.10) are direct exporters, these marginal effects, in fact, are economically meaningful. Consider these counterfactuals. If all SMEs' knowledge of customs law is 'good' (index value of 1), the (average) predicted probability of exporting increases to 0.25 (with a standard error of 0.03) up from 0.17 (0.02) when knowledge of customs law is 'poor.' Because of higher thresholds to exporting directly, the probability of exporting directly increases only to 0.19 (0.03) if knowledge of customs law improves to 'good' up from 0.09 (0.01) when knowledge of the law is 'poor.' These estimates highlight the importance of information in entering foreign markets.
Fourth, the propensity to work as subcontractor is associated with improvements on existing products. The likelihood of subcontracting increases by 0.07, ceteris paribus. These marginal effects are economically meaningful when compared to the fact that only 14 per cent (0.14) of the SMEs in the sample work as subcontractors. Our results indicate that SMEs that did not make any improvements on existing products have a 0.13 (with a standard error of 0.01) likelihood of working as subcontractors. If these SMEs made product improvements (a counterfactual), the likelihood of subcontracting increases to 0.20 (0.03), a statistically significant increase at the 5 per cent level. This counterfactual highlights the importance of investing in improvements of existing products (independent of contractor demands) in the decision to work as subcontractor. Finally, the likelihood of exporting (broad definition) increase by 8 percentage points for SMEs that adopted new processes or technologies (Table 9) . Consider a scenario whereby SMEs that did not adopt new processes (actual) are assumed to have adopted new processes (counterfactual), the likelihood of exporting increases from 0.13 (0.01) to 0.19 (0.04), a statistically significant increase at the 10 per cent level. Notes: Sample: balanced panel. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors calculated using the delta method. Regressions include a complete set of time, location, and industry qualitative indicators. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1, 5, 10 per cent level. See Table 1 for data source.
Concluding remarks and extensions
In a short time, Viet Nam has become an important merchandise exporter worldwide. It was ranked 26 in 2016 (WTO, 2017b), but more than half of the country's exports in 2015 originated from FIEs while Viet Nam's SMEs only account for 20 per cent of exports (International Trade Center, 2015) . Close to 66 per cent of private sector employment was with SMEs in 2012 (Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2014) . Given this backdrop, we investigate issues related to SMEs' exporting and subcontracting decisions. We find evidence that knowledge of customs law increases the likelihood of exporting directly. Based on this result, an aggressive informational campaign by government or business associations to increase SMEs' knowledge of customs law is an important precondition to foreign market participation. Because exporting is hard, the subcontracting route has been touted as an option for SMEs worldwide (e.g. International Trade Centre, 2015). Subcontracting traditionally involves large enterprises. Subcontracting as an option for SMEs is a much understudied area in the literature. We uncover some evidence that the likelihood of subcontracting is associated with improvements in existing products while the likelihood of exporting is associated with adoption of new processes or technologies. Thus, expanding programmes that enhance the technical capacity of the SMEs could potentially expand their participation in foreign markets or subcontract work for FIEs operating in Viet Nam.
A comprehensive approach to SME development was put in place in 2009 not only to increase the contribution of SMEs to Viet Nam's total output, but also to make them competitive. SME competitiveness can be looked at in these dimensions: scope (i.e. limited but profitable), market coverage (i.e. national versus local), and scale (small but growing), see International Trade Center (2015) . Potential extensions to the current study can touch on these dimensions. A first extension is to investigate the correlates of SME mark-up. Prior studies estimate mark-ups using output (value added or revenue) and input (employment, material usage, and capital stock) data which require strong assumptions on production technology, market structure, and consumer preferences. The surveys contain price, cost per unit, and quantity produced and sold data at the product level useful for mark-up analysis in the tradition of Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry, Khandelwal, and Verhoogen (2015) . A second extension is based on the observation that not only are the SMEs domestic market focused, their activities are highly localized. The market reach of the SMEs is limited to their home province. What factors contribute to this home market (province) bias? In particular, are there policy biases or regulations at the provincial level limiting access by SMEs from other provinces? A third extension is related to the notion that the bias towards smallness (in size) is explained by 'fear of growth' as growth might attract the attention of corrupt officials, or puts the enterprise at risk of unwarranted repeated inspections for compliance with tax, labour, or environmental regulations. 31 The survey asks a series of questions related to government inspections for policy and technical compliance. Do we observe a correlation between enterprise growth and the number of inspections it experiences historically? Studying See notes on Table 9 . 31 Officials have incentives to pursue investigations as their performance evaluations are partly based on the number of investigations they handle (Dau, 2016) .
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